An electronic asset system includes tamper-resistant electronic wallets that store non-transferable electronic assets. To break such tamper-resistant wallets, the criminal is expected to spend an initial investment to defeat the tamper-resistant protection. The electronic assets are uniquely issued by an institution to a wallet (anonymously or non-anonymously). During expenditure, the electronic assets are transferred from the wallet to a recipient. Since the assets are non-transferable, they are marked as exhausted assets upon expenditure. The recipient then batch deposits the received electronic assets with a collecting institution (which may or may not be the same as the issuing institution). A fraud detection system samples a subset of the exhausted assets received by the recipient to detect "bad" assets which have been used in a fraudulent manner. Upon detection, the fraud detection system identifies the electronic wallet that used the bad asset and marks it as a "bad wallet". The fraud detection system then compiles a list of bad electronic wallets and distributes the list to warn potential recipients of the bad electronic wallets. When a bad wallet next attempts to spend assets (whether fraudulently or not), the intended recipient will check the local hot list of bad wallets and refuse to transact business with the bad wallet.